本文作者：王莺

*中文非AI作品

一、IEEPA关税

A. IEEPA Tariffs

特朗普于2019年在其第一任总统任期内，以触发《国际紧急经济权力法案》（International Emergency Economic Powers Act，IEEPA）为由，向中国及加拿大、墨西哥等国加征关税。2025年2月，特朗普第二任任期伊始，他再次向更大范围的全球主要国家祭出IEEPA关税。

During his first presidential term in 2019, President Trump imposed additional tariffs on China, as well as on countries such as Canada and Mexico, on the grounds of invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In February 2025, at the beginning of his second term, he again imposed IEEPA tariffs on a broader range of major countries around the world.

目前，针对中国商品的IEEPA关税主要包括：

At present, the IEEPA tariffs on Chinese goods mainly include:

1. 基础附加税：10%；

1.A base surtax: 10%;

2. 芬太尼税：2025年11月10日之后已经从20%降低为10%；以及

2. A fentanyl tax: reduced from 20% to 10% after November 10, 2025; and

3. 互惠（对等）关税（目前已经从高点降至10%）等。

3. Reciprocal (parity) tariffs (currently reduced to 10% from the previous peak), among others.

针对中国的其他关税，例如301关税等，不属于IEEPA关税范围，本文不予讨论。

Other tariffs on China, such as the Section 301 tariffs, do not fall within the scope of IEEPA tariffs and are not discussed in this document.

通常，进口关税由进口商申报（除非中国出口商使用DDP贸易术语来主动承担美国关税），因此，大部分IEEPA关税目前（形式上）仍由美国进口商承担，有些进口商也与中国出口商分担部分加征成本，并可能同时与美国的下游批发商（例如大型超市）或零售企业分摊关税。但是毫无疑问，供应链中的所有环节都因IEEPA关税受到不同程度的影响。

Generally, import duties are declared by the importer (unless a Chinese exporter uses DDP terms and voluntarily assumes U.S. duty liability). Therefore, most IEEPA tariffs are currently borne (formally) by U.S. importers. Some importers also share part of the additional tariff burden with Chinese exporters and may simultaneously allocate the tariff costs to downstream U.S. wholesalers (such as large supermarkets) or retail companies. Nonetheless, all segments of the supply chain are undoubtedly affected to varying degrees by the IEEPA tariffs.

2025年5月28日，美国国际贸易法院（Court of International Trade）在V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States和State of Oregon v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security案（后两案被合并）中作出裁决，认定总统无权依据IEEPA加征关税。特朗普政府随后将此案上诉至联邦巡回法院，巡回法院于2025年8月29日判决维持原判（即判政府败诉），特朗普政府随后将此案上诉至美国联邦最高法院，目前正在等待最高法院的终审判决。由于政府要求加速审理，预期本案最快可能在12月底或明年年初会有结果。

On May 28, 2025, in V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States and State of Oregon v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (the latter two cases having been consolidated), the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled that the President does not have the authority to impose tariffs under IEEPA. The Trump Administration subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which on August 29, 2025, affirmed the lower court’s decision (i.e., ruling against the government). The Trump Administration then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the case is currently awaiting the Supreme Court’s final decision. Because the government has requested expedited review, the earliest expected outcome may come in late December or early next year.

二、 退税与否的讨论及应对策略

B. II. Discussion on Whether Refunds Will Be Available and Recommended Response Strategies

公开资料显示，在11月5日结束的口头辩论中，最高院大法官中多数（包括由特朗普任命的三位大法官）可能会倾向于认定依据IEEPA征收关税违宪。但是，即便最高院最终认定IEEPA关税违宪，对于已经清算的报关单海关是否会退税，目前仍存在不同的讨论。我认为，之所以有此不确定性，源于美国法院所遵循的“司法克制”（judicial restraint）原则。

Public information shows that during the oral argument that concluded on November 5, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices (including the three Justices appointed by President Trump) may be inclined to find that imposing tariffs under IEEPA is unconstitutional. However, even if the Supreme Court ultimately rules that the IEEPA tariffs are unconstitutional, there remains ongoing debate over whether Customs will refund duties on entries that have already been liquidated. In my view, this uncertainty arises from the principle of “judicial restraint” followed by U.S. courts.

介绍“司法克制”原则前，先简单介绍一下美国的三权分立制度。所谓“三权分立”指的是立法（国会）、行政（总统）和司法（法院）三个权力相互制衡（所谓的check and balance）。司法分支是在首席大法官约翰·马歇尔任下最后成型的一个分支，他在著名的马伯利诉麦迪逊案（Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137)）中确立的司法审查制度允许法院审查国会/州议会的立法及政府行政行为的合宪性，从而极大扩张了法院在三权分立中的影响力，最终使得三权分立成为三足鼎立。

Before introducing the principle of judicial restraint, it is helpful to briefly describe the U.S. system of separation of powers. “Separation of powers” refers to the legislative (Congress), executive (President), and judicial (courts) branches, which mutually check and balance each other. The judicial branch took its final shape under Chief Justice John Marshall, who in the landmark case Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137) established the system of judicial review. Judicial review allows courts to examine the constitutionality of legislation enacted by Congress or state legislatures, as well as executive actions of the government, thereby greatly expanding the judiciary’s influence within the separation-of-powers structure and ultimately making the three branches into a true three-way balance of power.

然而，实践中，法院也意识到，对自身权力的过度扩张可能导致司法权侵蚀立法权和行政权，从而使法院成为“超级立法者”。为此，法院逐步建立了一套“司法克制”原则，即：法院（尤其是最高院）在审理案件时，应避免过度干预行政机关或立法机关的决定，只在必要时才宣布法律（由国会颁布）或行政行为（由总统领导的行政分支作出，例如颁布IEEPA关税的总统行政令）无效。在行政法背景下，司法克制强调法院尊重行政机关专业判断和政策空间，尤其是经济、贸易、外交等领域。它要求法官在审理案件（特别是宪法案件）时，尽可能克制自己行使权力，不轻易推翻立法机关或行政机关的决定，尽量尊重国会和政府的决定。

However, in practice, courts have also recognized that excessive expansion of judicial power could result in the judiciary encroaching on the legislative and executive branches, effectively turning courts into “super-legislators.” For this reason, courts gradually developed the principle of judicial restraint. Under this principle, courts (especially the Supreme Court) should avoid overly interfering with the decisions of administrative agencies or the legislative branch, and should declare legislation (enacted by Congress) or executive actions (undertaken by the President—such as the executive orders imposing IEEPA tariffs) invalid only when necessary. In the administrative-law context, judicial restraint emphasizes deference to the expertise and policy space of administrative agencies, particularly in fields such as economics, trade, and foreign affairs. It requires judges, when adjudicating cases—especially constitutional cases—to exercise self-restraint, avoid easily overturning decisions made by Congress or the Executive Branch, and respect legislative and governmental decisions as much as possible.

在理解了上述现实和法律背景后，我认为，即便最高院推翻IEEPA关税行政令，其对退税的态度仍存在不确定性。下面分析一下几种主流的对退税可能性及相关流程的讨论，以及我们认为进口商应考虑采取的对可能获得的退税权进行保护的措施：

In light of the above practical and legal background, I believe that even if the Supreme Court strikes down the executive orders imposing IEEPA tariffs, uncertainty will remain regarding its stance on refunds. Below is an analysis of several mainstream views regarding the likelihood of refunds and the related procedural pathways, as well as the protective measures that we believe importers should consider to safeguard any potential refund rights:

1. 最悲观的预测：

最高院虽然判决撤销IEEPA关税行政令，但是出于种种考量，决定该判决不具有追溯力，即：仅要求判决生效后不再征收该关税，但是对于已征收的关税，或者已结清的关税，不予退还。

1. Most pessimistic prediction:

The Supreme Court invalidates the executive orders imposing IEEPA tariffs but, for various reasons, decides that the ruling is not retroactive. In other words, it orders that the tariffs not be collected going forward after the judgment becomes effective, but duties already collected—or already liquidated—will not be refunded.

2. 较有可能的预测：

最高法院虽然推翻IEEPA关税，但并不提及关税退税事宜或具体退税流程。这种情况下，可能需要进口商独立提起诉讼以争取退税。

2. More likely prediction:

The Supreme Court overturns the IEEPA tariffs but does not address the issue of refunds or specify refund procedures. In this scenario, importers may need to pursue independent litigation to seek refunds.

a. 传统退税申请路径：先抗议（protest）再诉讼：

a. Traditional refund pathway: protest first, then litigation:

对每一票进口报关单在清算（liquidation）日后的180天内向海关（CBP）提交正式的抗议。大多数报关单会在入境美国之日后的314天结关。不过，海关也可以（并且有些已经）在更短的时间内完成结关和清算。

For each import entry, a formal protest must be filed with CBP within 180 days after liquidation. Most entries liquidate on the 314th day after entry into the United States. However, CBP may (and in some instances already does) liquidate entries sooner.

这种情况下，美国进口商及受波及的中国出口商应密切监控其报关单的清算情况，并对每一票已清算报关单就IEEPA关税的合法性及时向海关提交抗议。

In this circumstance, U.S. importers and the affected Chinese exporters should closely monitor the liquidation status of their entries and file timely protests with CBP challenging the legality of the IEEPA tariffs for each liquidated entry.

但是，通过行政抗议申请退税的传统路径是否适用IEEPA关税也存在理论争议，因为：尽管在有限的情况下（例如19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)所规定的商品估价、税则归类、关税计算错误等），进口商可以在关税清算后180天内提交抗议（protest）以申请退税，但是，本次由于总统的行政令违宪而被最高院宣布无效这种情况是否属于19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)规定的可以通过抗议来申请退税的范围，尚存争议。因此，采用清算后再提交抗议申请退税的方法很可能被政府否决。

However, whether the traditional administrative protest pathway is applicable to IEEPA tariff refunds remains a theoretical question. Although importers can—in limited circumstances such as valuation, classification, or calculation errors under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)—file protests within 180 days after liquidation, it is debatable whether a Supreme Court ruling invalidating a presidential executive order on constitutional grounds falls within the types of decisions for which a protest may be used to seek refunds under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). Therefore, the method of seeking refunds by filing protests after liquidation is likely to be rejected by the government.

一旦发生这种情况，进口商可能需要进一步向国际贸易法院发起诉讼以要求退税（28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)），但是，届时由于关税已清算（因为是先清算才能提出抗议，如果抗议后再起诉，关税已经清算完毕），这种诉讼的成功概率可能远小于关税尚未清算就发起退税诉讼的成功概率（也就是我们后面在c中会提到的目前最审慎的“起诉+申请临时禁令”的保护策略）。

If that occurs, importers may need to further file suit with the Court of International Trade under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) to seek refunds. However, because the duties would already have been liquidated (liquidation occurs before a protest can be filed, and litigation is filed only after the protest), the probability of success would likely be significantly lower than that of litigation filed before liquidation (i.e., the more protective “litigation + request for temporary injunctive relief” strategy discussed later in section c).

此外，即便最高院支持，并且政府不否决，如果仅考虑以行政抗议的方式申请退税，进口商仍需考虑：

In addition, even if the Supreme Court supports refunds and the government does not reject them, importers relying solely on the administrative protest route must still consider:

（1） 如果最高院的有利判决是在进口商的关税被清算后的180天之后才作出，那么进口商就彻底丧失了以抗议方式通过行政程序提交退税申请的可能（因为超过了提交抗议的180天时限）；或者

(1) If the Supreme Court issues its favorable ruling more than 180 days after the liquidation of an importer’s entries, the importer will completely lose the ability to seek refunds via protest because the protest deadline will have expired; or

（2） 如果进口商在IEEPA关税政策发布后的进口批次较多，将不得不等每一件申报被清算后再提出抗议程序，届时不仅退税流程被延长，而且，如果退税被认可并成为共识，进口商将可能面临一场史诗级的抗议排队和退税等待浪潮，考虑到目前美国政府的效率，我们无法对退税效率给出任何有意义的估算。而采用后面讲到的诉讼方式，则可能得到法院的合并审理和退税裁定，海关执行退税可能更快。

(2) If an importer had a high volume of entries after the IEEPA tariff policy was implemented, it would have to wait for the liquidation of each individual entry before filing a protest. This would significantly prolong the refund process. And if refunds are recognized and become consensus, importers could face an unprecedented surge of protests and refund claims. Given current U.S. government efficiency levels, we cannot meaningfully estimate refund processing timelines. By contrast, pursuing litigation (as discussed later) could result in consolidated judicial review and orders for refund, which CBP may execute more quickly.

综上，IEEPA关税一旦被美国海关清算，即使未来最高院判决政府败诉并支持海关退税，这部分已被清算的关税仍可能被政府排除在退税范围之外。

In sum, once IEEPA tariffs are liquidated, even if the Supreme Court later rules against the government and endorses refunds, duties that have already been liquidated may still be excluded from any refund order.

b. 直接诉讼的保护路径之一：诉讼 + 抗议

b. One Protective Pathway Through Direct Litigation: Litigation + Protest

若政府败诉，美国政府可能会主张IEEPA关税的追回将仅限于那些在美国国际贸易法院提交了自己关税诉讼的进口商，而不适用于仅向海关提交行政抗议的进口商。根据该理论：该诉讼应在IEEPA关税实施之日起两年内提交。

If the government loses, it may argue that refunds of IEEPA tariffs should be limited only to importers that filed their own tariff lawsuits with the U.S. Court of International Trade, and not to importers that only filed administrative protests with CBP. Under this theory, such lawsuits must be filed within two years from the date the IEEPA tariffs were implemented.

我们认为，在这种情况下，进口商可以预先采取的比较安全的做法是：一方面及时向法院提交退税诉状；另一方面，在报关单清算后，向海关提交行政抗议。

We believe that in this situation, the safer approach importers may take is to: on the one hand, timely file refund complaints with the court; and on the other hand, after liquidation of the entry, file administrative protests with CBP.

c. 直接诉讼的保护路径之二：起诉 + 申请临时禁令

c. Another Protective Pathway Through Direct Litigation: Filing Suit + Requesting a Preliminary Injunction

另外一种对进口商而言更不利（但有法律依据）的理论认为：只有由进口商在海关清算（liquidation）之前已经向美国国际贸易法院发起的诉讼，才能触发对IEEPA关税的退还。换言之，一旦某报关单已被美国海关清算，进口商可能将无法再通过任何程序获得IEEPA关税的退还，即便其及时向海关提出行政抗议。

Another theory—less favorable to importers but supported by legal authority—holds that only lawsuits filed with the U.S. Court of International Trade before liquidation of the entries can support recovery of IEEPA tariffs. In other words, once an entry has been liquidated by CBP, the importer may no longer be able to obtain a refund of the IEEPA tariff under any procedure, even if it timely files an administrative protest.

依据19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)，已经清算的关税是最终且具有决定性的（final and conclusive），除了该条规定的几种有限的情形，清算完成后就会关闭不再审议。因此不排除这种可能，即：政府宣布已被清算的关税不再退税。

Under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a), liquidated duties are final and conclusive, and except for a few limited situations enumerated in that statute, liquidation closes the matter to further review. Therefore, it is possible that the government will declare that duties already liquidated will not be refunded.

我们认为，为预防该理论被采纳所造成的无法退税的风险，进口商采取最审慎和最保守的做法仍是明智之举，具体而言：尽快在美国国际贸易法院提交自己的退税诉状，并申请临时禁令（preliminary injunction）（28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)），要求法院禁止海关在最高院作出判决并确认退税流程之前清算报关单。

We believe that to guard against the risk that this theory may be adopted and thereby block refunds, the most prudent and conservative course of action for importers remains: promptly filing refund complaints with the U.S. Court of International Trade and requesting a preliminary injunction (28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)) to prohibit CBP from liquidating entries until after the Supreme Court issues its decision and clarifies the refund procedures.

事实上，已有不少企业向国际贸易法院提起诉讼并申请临时禁令。政府已在就该些临时禁令与企业进行谈判，试图以（若败诉）将不以关税已清算为由拒绝退税的承诺，换取企业撤回临时禁令申请。

In fact, many companies have already filed lawsuits and requested preliminary injunctions with the Court of International Trade. The government has begun negotiating with these companies, attempting to obtain withdrawal of preliminary-injunction requests by promising (if it loses) that it will not deny refunds on the basis that the duties were already liquidated.

3. 最乐观的预测：

最高院判决政府败诉，要求或者政府自行决定自动发放关税退款，进口商无需采取任何行动。这种救济可能有赖于法院基于现有诉讼作出命令、通过国会立法，或以新的总统行政令等形式出现。

3. Most Optimistic Prediction:

The Supreme Court rules against the government and orders—or the government independently decides—to automatically issue refunds without requiring importers to take any action. Such relief could stem from court orders based on pending litigation, new legislation enacted by Congress, or new presidential executive orders.

不过笔者认为这种可能性非常小，考虑到有消息称特朗普曾提及2025年征收的IEEPA关税数额已经接近或达到惊人的1000亿美元左右，而美国债务危机愈演愈烈，特朗普政府将不遗余力保护已经收到的关税，因此，不仅不太可能主动退税，甚至可能采取激进措施要求国会修改IEEPA、发布新的行政令等，以保护已经或即将到手的关税。

三、 无保护措施情况下风险敞口最高的企业——看进口时间

C. Companies with the Highest Exposure When No Protective Measures Are Taken — Depending on Import Timing

按美国海关正常 314 天 的清算周期，以下几类进口申报最有可能在美国最高法院最终判决前被清算，因此风险最高：

Under CBP’s standard 314-day liquidation cycle, the following categories of import entries are the most likely to be liquidated before the Supreme Court issues its final decision, and therefore carry the highest risk:

1. 中国芬太尼相关 IEEPA关税（自 2025 年 2 月 4 日实施）

2025 年 2 月 4 日或之后进口到美国的货物，预计将自 2025 年 12 月 15 日起陆续开始清算。

1. China-related fentanyl IEEPA tariffs (effective February 4, 2025)

Entries imported into the United States on or after February 4, 2025, are expected to begin liquidating on or after December 15, 2025.

2. 墨西哥、加拿大芬太尼 IEEPA关税（自 2025 年 3 月 4 日实施）

预计自 2026 年 1 月 12 日起 开始清算。

2. Mexico and Canada fentanyl IEEPA tariffs (effective March 4, 2025)

Liquidation is expected to begin on January 12, 2026.

3. “解放日”关税（Liberation Day Tariffs，自 2025 年 4 月 2 日实施）

预计自 2026 年 2 月 10 日起 开始清算。

3. “Liberation Day” tariffs (effective April 2, 2025)

Liquidation is expected to begin on February 10, 2026.

如果您的企业在这些时间段内有美国进口关税申报，则退税权益在无保护性措施的情况下可能面临风险。

If your company has U.S. import entries falling within these time periods, its refund rights may be at risk in the absence of protective measures.

四、 建议：为每家企业单独提交保护性诉讼

D. Recommendation: File Separate Protective Litigation for Each Company

根据上述几种讨论，我认为，虽然目前美国最高法院的决定尚不明确，但是您若已承担了IEEPA关税，那么为保护可能获得的退税权，有必要尽快与您的律师沟通并评估可以采取的保护性策略。

Based on the above discussions, although the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision is not yet clear, if you have already borne IEEPA tariffs, it is necessary to promptly communicate with your attorney and evaluate the protective strategies available to safeguard potential refund rights.

对于即将进入美国海关清算周期的报关单，最审慎保守、也是最能保护企业利益的做法是：直接向美国国际贸易法院提起保护性救济措施（protective action），申请对尚未清算部分IEEPA关税的临时禁令。该类案件属于程序性措施，目的仅在于“冻结”相关进口报关单的状态，确保未来最高法院的裁决（若有利于进口商）能够适用于您的企业。这种做法将使与进口商报关单相关的现状得以维持，直至最高院作出判决并且退款流程得以明确。

For entries that will soon enter CBP’s liquidation cycle, the most prudent, conservative, and protective approach is to file a protective action with the U.S. Court of International Trade and request a preliminary injunction on the portion of IEEPA duties that has not yet been liquidated. Such cases are procedural measures whose sole purpose is to “freeze” the status of the relevant import entries to ensure that any future Supreme Court ruling (if favorable to importers) will apply to your company. This approach preserves the status quo of the importer’s entries until the Supreme Court issues its decision and the refund process becomes clear.

进口商应选择对自己最合适的策略：提出行政抗议、提起法院诉讼，或是观望事态发展。

Importers should choose the strategy that best suits their situation: filing administrative protests, filing court actions, or monitoring developments.

王莺

上海分所 合伙人

微信：Ying_Legal

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王莺律师，曾就读于华东政法大学法学院，为经济法专业法学学士；美国佩珀代因大学法学院，“争议解决专业（国际商事仲裁方向）”法学硕士；美国佩珀代因大学法学院，“美国法”法学硕士。

王律师专注于国际贸易、跨境争议解决（国际商事仲裁）、外国直接投资、并购及一般公司事务。

王律师在中国拥有超过20年的专业经验，能够熟练地用中英双语提供法律服务。她曾为众多跨国公司、国有企业和私营公司提供法律咨询与服务，涉及能源、制造业、科技、制药、酒店、教育和金融等多个行业。

国际商事仲裁是她的主要专业领域之一。在美就读法学硕士期间，她接受了知名美国仲裁员和国际商事仲裁学者的培训，并参加了国际商会仲裁院和FIAA（国际仲裁辩护基金会）举办的培训项目，重点学习国际商会仲裁院仲裁程序和证人询问技术。

王律师代理客户参与并赢得了包括国际商会仲裁院、贸仲、上海国际仲裁中心、广州仲裁委等国内外仲裁机构的境内外仲裁程序及临时仲裁庭。此外，她还曾代表一位中国投资者，在针对某欧洲国家的投资仲裁案件中提供法律服务。

她在与复杂对手方的谈判中拥有丰富的经验，并能有效应对和化解跨文化和商业的各种冲突。在加入中伦文德律师事务所之前，王女士曾在多家知名的国内外律师事务所执业，并在一家国有能源企业担任法律部经理。她还曾受邀担任贸仲杯、VISMOOT国际商事辩论赛评委，并多次为包括阿里巴巴、江苏省商会等在内的诸多企业提供国际仲裁及境外投资法律风险防控的讲座。

特别声明

Special Declaration

以上文章仅代表作者本人观点，不代表北京市中伦文德律师事务所或其律师出具的任何形式之法律意见或建议。如需转载或引用该等文章的任何内容，请私信沟通授权事宜。如您有意就相关议题进一步交流或探讨，欢迎与本所联系。